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Building on the results of a participant observation in a Chinese IT-sector company 
located in the northern part of China, this paper aims to clarify the nature of deception 
in markets. Contrary to the position of information economics and game theoretical 
approaches to trust, the paper argues that deception is not reducible to a question of 
opportunism or sending signals in order to create trustworthiness. Deception, in fact, 
may coexist and even be strictly entangled with self-deception, which builds on the 
conception of an agent whose rationality can fail or whose cognition can be biased. 
This paper argues that rationality failures and cognitive biases are not driven by psycho-
logical mechanisms alone. They have to be related to the social structure in which eco-
nomic actors operate. In particular, the paper focuses on anticipatory socialization as 
one source of self-deception and the deception of others. Both types of deception are 
associated with a gap between aspirations and the available resources necessary for at-
taining them.
Zusammenfassung
Ausgehend von einer teilnehmenden Beobachtung in einem chinesischen IT-Unterneh-
men in Nordchina zielt dieser Artikel darauf ab, das Wesen der Täuschung in Märkten 
zu ergründen. Im Gegensatz zu der Position der Informationsökonomie und dem spiel-
theoretischen Ansatz in der Vertrauensforschung wird in diesem Artikel davon ausge-
gangen, dass Täuschung nicht auf Fragen des Opportunismus und der Signalsendung, 
die dem Aufbau von Vertrauen dient, reduziert werden kann. Täuschung kann zusam-
men mit Selbsttäuschung auftreten und sogar stark mit ihr verbunden sein. Selbst-
täuschung baut auf dem Konzept eines Akteurs auf, dessen Rationalität versagen oder 
dessen Wahrnehmung verzerrt sein kann. In diesem Papier wird argumentiert, dass 
Rationa-litätsversagen und Wahrnehmungsverzerrung nicht nur von psychologischen 
Mechanismen her-vorgerufen werden, sondern mit der Sozialstruktur verbunden sind, 
in der der wirtschaftliche Akteur operiert. Im Besonderen konzentriert sich der Artikel 
auf antizipatorische Sozialisation als eine Quelle für Selbsttäuschung und Täuschung 
von anderen. Beide Typen der Täuschung entstehen aus der Kluft zwischen Wunschvor-
stellungen und den verfügbaren Ressourcen, die für ihre Realisierung notwendig sind.
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1 Introduction
Prominent scandals that have hit the financial markets in the last decade, from the 
Enron case to the recent financial crisis, have helped underline the fraudulent and de-
ceptive character of markets (Fleming/Zyglidopoulos 2009; Gerschlager 2005a; Har-
rington 2009b; Kroger 2004). For example, in global business, high expectations about 
producing in low-wage, prominently emerging capitalist economies often clash with 
a reality of inefficiency and deception as far as the abilities and intentions of the co-
operation partner are concerned (Piotti 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). The growing market of 
counterfeits is built on deception on the part of both the producers and the consumers. 
Consumers may buy counterfeit goods without knowing it or with the aim of deceiv-
ing others about their socio-economic status (Higgins/Rubin 1986; Grossman/Shapiro 
1988). Similarly, empirical surveys on online dating show that dating websites provide a 
platform for smaller or bigger lies in self-presentation (Gibbs/Ellison/Heino 2006). 
These simple examples illustrate how widespread deception is in today’s markets. Still, 
some questions about its nature remain unsolved. In the literature, there seem to be two 
conflicting interpretations of deception. Deception is considered either to be mainly 
strategic or the result of a rationality failure.
For instance, the position maintained by information economics underlines the essen-
tial role played by asymmetry of information as source of deception (Akerlof 1970; 
Husted 2007), given the assumption that human nature is intrinsically opportunistic 
(Williamson 1979, 1985). Deception has also been associated with sending signals in or-
der to create trustworthiness. These strategic signals can be purely manipulative (Gam-
betta 2009; Gambetta/Bacharach 2001) or may be part of a reassuring strategy on the 
part of the trust-giver (Beckert 2005). In contrast, behavioral economics and studies on 
rationality focus on self-deception as a peculiar form of deception in which the self is 
the target of deceptive beliefs. It is the result of rationality failures and bias (Bach 1981; 
Davidson 1986; Elster 1985, 1989; Festinger 1957; Oksenberg Rorty 1988). As Oksen-
berg Rorty (1986: 125) puts it: “Self-deception involves deception of the self, by the self, 
for or about the self.”
Theoretically, this contribution intends to go beyond these unilateral positions and show 
that strategic deception and self-deception coexist and are even strongly entangled. 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented and discussed at the 22nd Annual Meeting of the Soci-
ety for the Advancement of Socio-Economics in Philadelphia, July 2010, and in the Research Group 
on the Sociology of Markets at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne. In 
particular we would like to thank Florian Becker-Ritterspach, Jens Beckert, Knut Lange, Christopher 
McNally, Guido Möllering, Sascha Münnich, and Zsuzsanna Vargha for their helpful comments. We 
also thank Martin Höpner and our referees Michael Reif and Tobias ten Brink for their valuable 
suggestions.
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While sharing the position of behavioral economics and rationality studies concerning 
the importance of self-deception in economic action, this paper argues that rationality 
failures and cognitive biases are not driven by psychological mechanisms alone. Rather, 
sociological mechanisms are also involved (Fleming/Zyglidopoulos 2009). In particular, 
anticipatory socialization appears to be one important source of self-deception and 
the deception of others that are both associated with a gap between aspirations and 
the available resources necessary for attaining them (March 2007), which presupposes 
social inequality (Merton 1938). 
In order to understand deception and its social drivers at a deeper level, we studied 
this phenomenon in the context of one emerging capitalist country that is character-
ized by a high degree of globalization – i.e., in an extreme case where deception can 
be assumed to be particularly widespread.1 In phases of high growth, rapid social and 
economic changes, legal uncertainty and social inequality actually favor fraudulent and 
deceptive behavior (Fligstein 2001; Merton 1938). Moreover, to the extent to which the 
long distances and the technological mediation of communication involved in global 
exchanges make deceptive behavior more difficult to detect, they also encourage decep-
tion (Hancock 2009).2
Empirically, this paper builds on the results of a participant observation in a Chinese 
IT-sector company located in the northern part of China. As is widely known, the 
emerging Chinese capitalist economy has experienced very rapid growth in the last 
three decades and is strongly globalized, not only in terms of export volumes but also 
because of the role played by Foreign Direct Investments (Naughton 2007; ten Brink 
2010)3 and sojourners abroad.4 
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 is devoted to the theoretical framing of the 
relationship between deception and self-deception and their respective social precondi-
tions. Chapter 3 deals with methodological issues. Finally, Chapters 4–6 are devoted to 
the results of the empirical research in the Chinese company we investigated. 
1 Obviously, we do not claim that deception and self-deception are absent in today’s industrial-
ized countries.
2 At the same time, Hancock (2009) has stressed that digital technology can also advance hon-
esty and self-disclosure: for example, in blogs or social support message boards and computer-
mediated therapy.
3 For recent data, see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113366.pdf. 
4 Sojourners can be defined as persons staying in a place that is not their home country for a 
period of time, including immigrant, non-immigrant and expatriate workers (Berry/Sam 1997; 
Williams 2000). Particularly since the 1990s, well-educated and skilled young Chinese people 
have emigrated abroad in order to study in foreign universities and then possibly return to 
China after graduating. For a general overview about migration trends in the Chinese popula-
tion, see Nyiri/Saveliev (2002).
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2 The nature of deception 
Deception can be defined as the manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence 
with the intention of promoting beliefs that are not true and inducing others to re-
act in a manner prejudicial to their own interests.5 Recent contributions on deception 
have shown how such definitions are built on the assumption that particular precon-
ditions are met: for instance, the possibility of determining the truth and ultimately 
distinguishing between true and false (Harrington 2009a; Solomon 2009) as well as the 
intrinsically deliberate, intentional, conscious character of deception (Lépinay/Hertz 
2005; Williamson 1985). Moreover, they are based on the assumption of negative con-
sequences for the deceived and therefore, on the ethically reprehensible character of 
deception itself. While this paper leaves aside the more cultural and philosophical ques-
tions about the accessibility of truth and concentrates on the negative consequences 
of deception,6 it explicitly focuses on the relationship between strategic deception and 
self-deception as well as on its social drivers.
In neoclassical economics, market actors are fully informed. Therefore, deception can-
not really exist and deceivers are simply crowded out by the market forces (Gerschlager 
2005b). Similarly, in game theory deception cannot take place because of the rationality 
assumption of mutual and common knowledge that allows for equilibrium. As Rizvi 
states (2005: 35): “It is difficult to see the possibility of deception if we assume that play-
ers know each other’s strategy choices and that they are rational. What is left to hide?” In 
information economics, however, deception becomes central to the analysis. Because of 
the bounded character of human cognition (Simon 1955), actors are not able to antici-
pate the strategy of other actors in economic exchanges. Therefore, information asym-
metry turns out to be a constitutive part of exchanges, and cheating becomes possible 
(Akerlof 1970; Husted 2007; Williamson 1979, 1985). Particularly in the Williamson 
variant of transaction costs economics – which additionally builds on the idea that hu-
man nature is intrinsically opportunistic – deception should be taking place all the time. 
However, deception and its consequences in terms of inefficiency for individual com-
panies and markets can be reduced through institutional devices (Williamson 1985). 
Bacharach and Gambetta identify different forms of deception such as lying, mimicry 
and faking in what they call the “secondary problem of trust” (Gambetta/Bacharach 
2001: 149). Since the truster observes the trustee in order to assess his trustworthiness, 
an opportunistic trustee may emit manipulated signals of trustworthy-making quali-
ties if he lacks them in reality (Gambetta 2009). He can also strategically send (false) 
5 Other synonyms for deception can be lying, double-dealing, subterfuge, trickery, betrayal and 
cunning. Although not all opportunistic behavior implies deception in the form of active ly-
ing or trickery, opportunistic behavior can be assumed to be more successful the more the real 
intentions are hidden (see Dumouchel 2005).
6 This choice is mainly topic-driven. In principle, we do not disagree on the fact that some forms 
of manipulation of evidence are intended to avoid hurting rather than to generate it (Möllering 
2009).
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identity signals in order to exploit a reputation (Gambetta/Bacharach 2001) or reassure 
the truster (Beckert 2005).
In the case of behavioral economics, the economic discipline takes a more evident cog-
nitive and psychological turn. The implications of Simon’s idea of bounded rationality 
are not only limited to opportunistic behavior considered as a rational answer to double 
contingency problems and asymmetry of information. Bounded rationality can also lead 
to irrational behaviors (Elster 1986; Rieskamp/Hertwig/Todd 2006). Not only do behav-
ioral economics introduce into their analysis intuitions and emotions (Kaufman 2006) 
that notably do not work according to the rules of rationality (Sontheimer 2006). They 
also build on a concept of cognitive boundedness according to which actors are system-
atically biased and use heuristics in order to cope with complexity (Kahneman/Tversky 
1982). This, however, is not free of charge. The price that actors pay for using mental 
shortcuts in order to make judgments in complex and uncertain environments is fallacy, 
i.e., deviation from (given) norms of rationality (Rieskamp/Hertwig/Todd 2006).
Studies on rationality make a distinction between fallacies of misperception and fal-
lacies of self-deception (Pears 1986). While misperception per se might have negative 
consequences, it does not involve intention because does not involve a motive (it might 
simply derive from an error in observation and evaluation). Self-deception, howev-
er, implies that individuals hold contradictory beliefs and have a motive7 (Elster 1986, 
1989; Oksenberg Rorty 1988). Overcoming this contradiction in belief systems in fact 
implies making a choice that is normally guided by the principle of pleasure. If one of 
the two beliefs is painful, for instance, individuals may reduce the cognitive dissonance 
(Elster 1985; Festinger 1957) that derives from the conflicting beliefs by acting as if the 
more auspicious belief were true;8 or they may choose to believe (and act according to) 
the position that they wish to be true (wishful thinking) (Davidson 1986; Elster 1986, 
1989). Wishful thinking is self-deceptive only if, as in the case of cognitive dissonance, 
the discrepancy between contrasting beliefs induces action aimed at restoring the image 
of reality as the actor wishes it to be (Bach 1981; Davidson 1986; McLaughlin 1988).
Although there are indeed cases in which lying to others and lying to ourselves can be 
clearly identified, recent studies have underlined the fact that usually, deception and 
self-deception are not clear-cut. On the contrary, they are intimately entangled with 
each other. As Solomon states, “To fool ourselves, we must either fool or exclude others, 
7 The role of intention in self-deception is the center of a dispute in the literature about skeptics 
and nonskeptics. For a detailed presentation of the two positions, see McLaughlin 1988.
8 In order to explain this phenomenon, Quattronne and Tversky (1984) present the example of 
the Calvinist dilemma – the same dilemma that Max Weber refers to in order to identify the nor-
mative basis for the development of capitalism (Weber 1958). Notoriously, in Calvinism, those 
who will be chosen for salvation or damned eternally are already predestinated by God; but the 
only thing Calvinists know is that damnation is associated with avarice, lust and sloth in the real 
life and, conversely, eternal life is connected to charity, purity and hard work. As a consequence, 
Calvinists will behave virtuously as if they were saved already (Quattronne/Tversky 1984).
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and to successfully fool others, we best fool ourselves” (Solomon 2009: 25). According 
to this view, hypothetically speaking, even Bacharach and Gambetta’s (2001) as well 
as Beckert’s (2005) strategic identity signaling could result in trustees who genuinely 
believe in the (manipulated) identity they act out. 
Since beliefs, erroneous or not, constitute the basis for behavior, beliefs that arise from 
wishful thinking or generate cognitive dissonance can be sources of deception to our-
selves (McLaughlin 1988) as well as to others. However, self-deception – like deception – 
cannot simply be considered as a pathological condition or a psychological drama. First 
of all, it is intrinsically social because our sense of ourselves depends on others, and in 
our self-presentation to others we hide and disguise those aspects of the self that are not 
relevant or even attractive to other people (Solomon 2009). By presenting themselves to 
others, people indirectly reflect tastes, social norms and expectations.
Secondly, the social mechanisms behind the self-presentation have to be considered. In 
particular, given the existing tastes, social norms and expectations, deception towards 
others deriving from self-deception is illustrated by the phenomena of anticipatory so-
cialization described in sociology. According to Merton (1968), those who aspire to be-
come members of a group are likely to adopt the role in advance – and then to deceive 
themselves and others to a certain extent. Similarly to Merton, Goffmann states that 
“when we come to be able to properly manage a real routine we are able to do this in part 
because of ‘anticipatory socialization,’ having already been schooled in the reality that 
is just coming to be real for us” (1959: 72; our emphasis). In fact, Goffmann underlines 
the intrinsically theatrical characteristics of role adoption and identifies two extreme 
behaviors on the part of the performers. While at the one extreme, we can find cynical 
performers who are not taken in by their own act at all and use their comparative advan-
tage of already knowing the act is being played in advance in order to reach other ends.9 
At the other extreme, performers can also be fully taken in by their own act and truly 
convinced that the impression of reality they are acting out is the true reality. They can 
also shift from being convinced role-performers to acting as cynical ones and vice versa.
Aspirations and wishes play an important role in anticipatory socialization.10 For Goff-
mann (1959), just like in a theater play, the mask is a representation of the self and what 
individuals strive to live up to. Moreover, according to Thornton and Nardi, a role ad-
aptation requires both social adjustment – meaning the meeting of role expectations in 
9 The metaphor of a theatrical performance is also used by Beckert (2005) while pointing to self-
presentation in order to create trustworthiness. However, he focuses on the strategic use of self-
presentation and neglects the possibility that actors believe in their performance, which makes 
it easier to convince the trust-giver. 
10 Essential preconditions for deception through anticipatory socialization are structural differen-
tiation and social inequality. The gap between aspirations and the real opportunities provided 
in the lower class can lead to opportunistic and fraudulent behavior (Merton 1938). However, 
it can also lead to imitation and conformity to the codes of higher classes (Beckert/Lutter 2008; 
Duisenberry 1967; Veblen [1899]1994).
10 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /13
behaviors – and psychological adjustment: i.e., “the achievement of congruity between 
psychological needs and desires and the role” (1975: 873). However, while anticipatory 
socialization has often been interpreted as being functional to a better adaptation to the 
future (when a role is really adopted), an individual can anticipate a role when he is still 
outside the reference group. This makes role conceptions sensitive to the influence of 
very generalized sources and stereotypes as well as to individual wants and needs. The 
degree to which the individual will gain consideration by the reference group in the end 
depends on how well the idealized and fantasized version of the role played by the indi-
vidual coincides with the role itself – i.e., how well the role has been anticipated (Thorn-
ton/Nardi 1975). Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that it also depends on the degree 
of trust granted to the deceiver (Möllering 2009), in our specific case on the willingness 
to believe on the part of the “audience” – i.e., the members of the reference group. In 
other words, anticipatory socialization can potentially result from wishful thinking and 
hence become self-deceptive as well as deceptive to others if individuals keep on playing 
their own version of the role even in the face of contradictory evidence.
3 Method
In order to distinguish between different natures of deception and to deeply understand 
the theoretical relationship between them, qualitative research is more suitable than 
quantitative data analysis. As Mintzberg describes it: “For while systematic data create 
the foundation for our theories, it is the anecdotal data that enable us to do the [theory] 
building” (1979: 587). In this respect, our paper focuses empirically on the case of a 
small German-Chinese IT-sector company located in a developing region of northern 
China. This choice of a case study is motivated by the fact that globalization and high 
growth economies are contexts in which deception can be assumed to be particularly 
widespread. First of all, in globalization, long distances and Internet-based communica-
tion potentially increase the payoffs of opportunism, since deception becomes harder 
to debunk (Hancock 2009). Moreover, according to Robert Merton (1938), in coun-
tries characterized by phases of high growth, infringement of social norms in order to 
achieve economic success may be a normal response. In fact, while individuals in differ-
ent classes can happen to share the same cultural emphasis on success, their opportuni-
ties to attain such achievements through legitimate means may differ considerably. 
This can also lead to fraudulent behaviors and deception (March 2007).11 Globalization 
may provide the platform for anticipatory socialization to take place and therefore for 
11 As a consequence of innovational behavior outside moral prescriptions, Merton cites anomie as 
cultural chaos and hence a lack of predictability in society. Similarly, when describing the chan-
nels through which inequality affects growth, Thorbecke states that “when the gap between rich 
and poor widens, the latter presumably have a greater temptation to engage in rent-seeking or 
predatory activities at the expense of the former” (2006: 650–651).
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both strategic deception and self-deception. Through media, business events,12 job and 
educational mobility as well as business exchange, globalization triggers the diffusion 
of knowledge about business practices, lifestyles and symbols of success. Especially in 
countries in phases of high growth, such diffusion can contribute to the development 
of aspirations and emulative behavior even when the necessary means to attain such 
aspirations are lacking (Berger 2002). In this context, foreign business partners can 
potentially become the targets of deceptive behavior.
As a “multinational” in China, the company we observed develops its business by ex-
ploiting the advantages of a global economy in an intrinsically highly globalized sec-
tor such as information technology, which produces goods and services that help to 
overcome distances in real time. In addition to its high export rates and conspicuous 
human resources in the form of Chinese people educated in foreign countries, in the 
last decade China has also become a central destination for business investments from 
the traditional capitalist countries and therefore a crucial context for business global-
ization.13 After decades in which private economic initiative had been substantially ne-
gated, China has experienced a strong economic boom, and therefore there are strong 
incentives for social actors to become successful entrepreneurs very quickly – for in-
stance, by entering profitable markets dominated by foreign companies.14 Despite the 
increasing investments in research and innovation from the side of the Chinese govern-
ment, also young innovative IT-sector companies may encounter difficulties. In fact 
they may not compete in quality, experience and credentials with well established inter-
national companies; the same companies that China needs to attract in order to diffuse 
knowledge in the country. 
The empirical result builds on our exceptional opportunity to observe a Chinese busi-
ness from inside. One of the authors, who has a good knowledge of Chinese, had the 
chance to carry out a participant observation in the company for one week during 
which she had the status of an intern, which means that she had enough time15 to get 
fully integrated into the current business activities of the small company and to gain 
12 See, for instance, the yearly international meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland, which is considered to be the place where the diffusion of the Western business 
culture which initiates processes of anticipatory socialization occurs (Berger 2002; Huntington 
1996).
13 In fact, the Chinese government has managed to attract a huge amount of Foreign Direct In-
vestments. Measured in the number of contracts, FDIs went from 22,347,000 in 2000 to a peak 
of 44,019,000 in 2005, declining progressively between 2006 and 2008 but remaining at a con-
spicuous level.
14 Certainly, societies and cultures can differ in the extent to which deception is tolerated or even 
encouraged (Harrington 2009a). However, in this paper, deception is not considered to be pri-
marily a product of the Chinese culture, but rather of China’s social stratification and its phase 
of rushed economic growth. 
15 We have calculated that through interviews and the analysis of older memos, our research is 
able to cover a time period of about nine months, i.e., over half of the total business life of the 
company in China. 
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sufficient information from employees and former interns about previous and present 
business. The fact that it was a small company enabled her to get acquainted with the 
firm’s structure and business in a relatively short period of time, to gain immediate 
access to the main actors and to witness emotions and justification patterns in their 
decision making. 
The research material deployed consists of the memos written systematically during the 
observation week and those written by former interns. These include the description 
of working tasks, activities and organization, the observation of the business location 
and infrastructures, and the content of conversations between the researcher, the man-
agers and the other employees.16 In addition to the memos, the reconstruction of the 
case is built on further empirical material, both publicly available and not. In fact, the 
researcher also had access to other sources that contributed to the analysis and the re-
search report. Public documents provided to clients, such as the company’s home page 
and its advertising brochure became important material for the analysis, along with 
minutes of meetings and company cost plans. 
In order to identify deception, we selected those events in which statements by the ac-
tors did not match reality and compared them with the aim of understanding the differ-
ent natures of deception involved. The systematic discussion of the empirical material 
between the researcher who conducted the field work and the researcher who remained 
at home and took the role of the devil’s advocate helped minimize possible interpreta-
tion biases (Eisenhardt 1989). 
In the next chapter, we will introduce the company which is the object of our study and 
then illustrate the different natures of deception based on examples from its business 
activities.
4 The company and the entrepreneurs
Company Ma17 is a family business. Since it is legally registered in Germany, it is for-
mally a German company. However, it is owned by a Chinese married couple whom we 
will call Mr. and Mrs. Qing, and it has a Chinese name. According to Company Ma’s 
self-presentation on its website and in public documents, the company business focuses 
on software development and IT services, particularly on services connected to the dif-
ferent applications of SAP software,18 and on general consulting services for companies 
16 For definition and further insights on methodology, see Jorgensen (1989).
17 In the interest of privacy, all names are fictitious.
18 SAP software was developed to improve transparency and coordination between different com-
pany functions such as Finance, Controlling, Materials Management, Sales and Distribution, 
Production Planning, and Human Resources.
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aiming to invest in China. The headquarters of Company Ma appears to be located in 
Germany. It also has a subsidiary in northern China. The former is officially managed 
by Mr. Qing, while the subsidiary in China is managed by his wife. Apparently, the com-
pany also makes use of several training centers all over Germany and China in order to 
train future employees. 
The Chinese subsidiary of Company Ma – the object of our observation – is a small 
business. Besides the owners, it consists of two additional employees: an IT specialist 
and a Human Resource Manager, both of whom graduated from a local university. At 
the time of the empirical observation, there were also two German interns (including 
the observer), which does not seem to have been a coincidence. Before that time, the 
company had already employed other (exclusively) German interns. Moreover, further 
internships are currently being offered to German students on the Internet. All the in-
terns were students in business and/or Chinese studies. 
In addition, similarly to other companies in the IT sector, the company has access to 
external collaborators (Biagiotti/Burroni 2004). In this specific case, the Chinese sub-
sidiary manages a database of IT experts from which potential clients can pick suitable 
IT workers for their tasks. Company Ma acts in principle as a broker.
The company’s philosophy is to build a bridge between China and Germany. Besides 
offering general consulting services, the core of its business includes providing German 
companies support in offshoring the whole range of their IT functions by exploiting 
new communication technologies. The idea is to attract foreign companies that want 
to pursue a cost-reducing strategy by supplying well-educated but inexpensive Chinese 
specialists. Indeed, the company seems to have already capitalized on several multina-
tional cooperation partners.
The two entrepreneurs are the embodiment of the Chinese globalizing trend. Like many 
other Chinese, Mr. Qing left China in order to get a foreign qualification. Specifically, 
he decided to go to Germany and study information technology at a university of ap-
plied science. According to the company’s official account, after his studies he took over 
a subsidiary of a German IT company, entered the IT business successfully and then 
expanded the business to China in order, from the position of a consultant, to take ad-
vantage of the growing German investment in the Far East as well as of his ability to deal 
with both cultures. His wife can also be considered to be a sojourner since she has lived 
in Germany as well, although she was quite cryptic about how long.19 Both partners 
exhibit a deep familiarity with the German town they claim to live in, and with German 
culture in general. Not only do they wear Western clothing, but they are also clearly 
committed to transferring German business styles to their IT company in China. 
19 Mrs. Qing stated vaguely that she had been living in Germany for about three to five years.
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Despite this professional appearance, contradictions and discrepancies already emerged 
after the first steps of research. In particular, deception turned out to be a constitutive 
part of the company’s business. Building on the case of Company Ma, in the following 
chapters, we will provide different interpretations of the nature of deception and in 
particular point to the relationship between strategic deception and self-deception. 
5 Strategic deception
Deception was observed in several substantial areas of the company’s business. In line 
with information economics and the game-theoretical approach to trust, misleading 
signals can be aimed at constructing a good reputation – in this specific case, that of a 
well-established and trustworthy company. The displayed date of the company’s foun-
dation is already a good example of false identity signaling. According to the homepage, 
the company was founded in 1996 in western Germany by a German entrepreneur, who 
in 1999 put Mr. Qing in charge of managing the first subsidiary in Germany. Nine years 
later, the Chinese manager founded the subsidiary in northern China that we observed. 
However, according to the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the German office 
owned by Mr. Qing was registered only in January 2007, and there is no trace of the 
company supposedly founded by the German entrepreneur.
Analogously, there is no trace of the training centers all over Germany that were proudly 
exhibited in the Chinese leaflet in order to portray Company Ma as a well-established 
company. As a matter of fact, even the role of the legally registered headquarters in Ger-
many seems to be rather mysterious. Mr. Qing was in the Chinese subsidiary during the 
whole internship, and there was no communication between the offices in China and in 
Germany. A former intern who had spent more than two months in the company even 
suggested that the office in Germany was merely fictitious.
On the website and in the Chinese leaflet, Company Ma also presented itself to both po-
tential German and Chinese clients as cooperating with several well-known multinational 
corporations such as Siemens AG, Volkswagen AG, Bayer AG, Watson Group – and what 
the company refers to as “American United Airline,”20 just to mention a few, as well as en-
gaging in a long-lasting cooperation with a medium-sized German company (Company 
AG) which specializes in IT solutions. However, we could not find any evidence of busi-
ness with any of the multinationals that the company boasted of working with.21 Even 
20 American United Airline does not exist. The name evidently merges two different airline com-
panies: United Airlines and American Airlines. 
21 A previous intern, who had the task of rewriting the website, deleted the misleading informa-
tion about the cooperation partners, but Mr. Qing insisted on stating the contacts publicly and 
re-entered them on the website.
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the long-lasting cooperation with Company AG was revealed to be merely a contract for 
a one-shot SAP training slot at the time of the participant observation. Deception is also 
evident if we examine the core business activity of Company Ma’s Chinese subsidiary at 
the time of the observation. The main aim of the company was, in fact, to enter the flour-
ishing and appealing SAP consulting business by positioning the company in the low-
cost segment. The German software development company SAP itself was operating in 
the same industrial park as Company Ma but offered training courses at a much higher 
price level. As a small business – and, as it appears at second glance – as a relatively young 
and not yet established company, Company Ma was highly dependent on resources pro-
vided by external actors as well as on a good reputation. Although Company Ma was very 
keen to enter an appealing market, it could not count on internal SAP specialists. The 
firm could have addressed the problem by resorting to the market and recruiting already 
skilled SAP consultants or by financing SAP training in-house. However, both strategies 
would have been very costly and would have undermined the positioning of the com-
pany in the low-cost sector. In fact, since SAP consultants were a scarce resource on the 
market, they were also very expensive. Unfortunately, the firm could not afford the costs 
for the regular training and examination procedure which would have provided its inter-
nal employees with an accredited SAP certificate either. Therefore, Company Ma simply 
bypassed these obstacles by shifting the costs of training to potential course participants. 
The training was promoted among students in the universities of the local province. In 
order to attend the SAP course, students would have had to pay the equivalent of 3,000 
Euros at that time22 and were promised future internships in Germany and good job 
opportunities in exchange. The German interns were in charge of promoting the SAP 
courses in the universities as well as indirectly supporting the German image and hence 
the company’s good reputation, even by making false promises.
In order to train its own employees, Company Ma had to rely on external SAP train-
ers. To this end, the firm signed a contract with the German IT company Company AG. 
According to the contract, Company AG would send a trainer for a one-month course, 
provide a textbook on SAP in German – or, if available, in English – while for its part, 
Company Ma was supposed to provide the training location, the technical equipment 
including the installation of a mini-version of the SAP software, the recruitment of the 
planned 100 trainees and an English course in order to make the trainees fit for to deal 
with the English-language training material.23 Moreover, it had to provide interpreting 
services during the course and, if necessary, a translation of the textbook into English. 
Because of cost constraints, the two partners agreed on a course for beginners that did 
not cover all the modules necessary for becoming an accredited SAP consultant, despite 
the promises made to the potential trainees in the leaflet and to clients on the website.
22 This was cheaper than the certified training courses provided by the SAP company itself, but it 
is still a huge amount by Chinese standards, especially considering the fact that, as we will see, 
the training only provided a beginning-level course. 
23 Including this preparation course, the trainees were expected to attend a total of three months 
of training.
16 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /13
According to the minutes of the meeting between Company Ma and Company AG, the 
Chinese firm tried to persuade its German partner to provide internships and even to 
mediate 50 percent of the Chinese trainees into suitable jobs. Moreover, Company AG 
should revise its website and provide its company profile in English as well, in order to 
be accessible for Chinese companies. But even more importantly, Company AG was 
asked to provide a database containing a list of the trainees certified at this particular 
SAP training which could be consulted by external companies to check the authentic-
ity of the certificates and hence of the qualification provided. This would help provide 
credibility and trustworthiness for Company Ma in the eyes of potential trainees and 
future clients. This assertion – namely that the trainees would receive a full SAP training 
course which would be documented online, gain experience by attending an internship 
or even obtain a job in a German company – had been publicly announced by Com-
pany Ma, but unfortunately none of these requirements were secured in a contract or 
through any kind of formal (or even informal) agreement. All in all, what Company Ma 
publicly “sold” as a long-lasting relationship was in fact a one-shot contract between 
the two companies.
All the cases mentioned above can be interpreted in the light of information econom-
ics and the game-theoretical approach to trust. Company Ma manipulated evidence in 
order to mislead others and induce beliefs about its good reputation and economic suc-
cess, i.e., by sending signals in the form of cooperation credentials. Interestingly enough, 
the targets of such signals could not easily detect the misleading information, which was 
widespread through the website and the leaflets, because of the geographical distance 
and the lack of social relationships that could provide the necessary information.
However, when we look more closely at the way its business was carried out, it becomes 
clear that Company Ma’s deceptive behavior was not only a matter of strategy and ratio-
nality, but that the lines between strategic deception and self-deception were blurred. 
6 Self-deception and anticipatory socialization
Some of the choices and behaviors observed among the two entrepreneurs and their 
employees hardly fit the picture of a simply opportunistic strategy. The production of 
misleading information can also be interpreted as the result of wishful thinking about 
the company’s successful future as well as in the broader context of anticipating the role 
of a successful German company, including the construction of an appropriate stage. 
From the entrepreneurs down to the employees, the Chinese staff was imbued with 
euphoria and confidence about the future of the company. These beliefs about the glo-
rious future of Company Ma were not only expressed in inner-office conversations, but 
were also translated into overhasty expansion plans. Within the coming two months Mr. 
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and Mrs. Qing planned to rent a new office in the same building and to buy the neces-
sary furniture. The new office was more than thirty times larger than the one they were 
working in at that time.24 The idea was to hire a lot of new specialists and to recruit 50 
percent of the trainees from the SAP training course carried out in cooperation with 
Company AG. This would have attracted further projects from German companies in 
China and Germany. 
The relationship with Company AG, which was formally based only on a one-shot con-
tract limited to the one-month SAP training course, can also be interpreted in the light 
of wishful thinking and anticipatory behavior. Company Ma made promises to poten-
tial trainees in the form of internships in Germany that went beyond the contractual 
basis and in fact presumed a much closer cooperative relationship between the two 
companies than actually existed. While from the perspective of the trainees, this could 
indeed be interpreted as a lie, according to Mr. Qing, he was just anticipating the future. 
In fact, he knew that Company AG was eager to enter the Chinese market and would 
then need to hire Chinese IT specialists. Therefore, he was certain that the German 
company would rather hire people whom it had also trained rather than unknown 
applicants. Despite the fact that in the meeting with Company AG, the German side 
reacted lukewarmly to a possible commitment in training, the Chinese entrepreneur 
genuinely believed what he wished – i.e., that a long lasting cooperation on training be-
tween the two companies would occur anyway and that all his plans would work out.
In addition to the uncertainty regarding the cooperation with the German company, 
there were actually further good reasons for concern: one and a half months before it 
was scheduled to begin, there were still no conditions in place for carrying out the first 
SAP course, i.e., the core business necessary for the company’s future success. Because 
of bad time management, no students had signed up for the course yet by that time, 
and considering the university schedules, it would hardly be possible to attract the 100 
participants needed in order for the course to take place.
More generally, the German interns had repeatedly expressed their concern about the 
whole business concept and the working style of the company based on very simple 
arguments. In fact, in a so-called SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
threats), a previous intern with a background in business studies came to the conclu-
sion that because of cultural and language distances as well as the time difference be-
tween Germany and China it would have been more reasonable for German companies 
to outsource IT consulting to Eastern European countries rather than to China. Unfor-
tunately, this analysis was not examined or discussed at all.25 
24 At that time the office was about 40 m². 
25 Oddly, however, this analysis was one of the first documents given to a new intern as informa-
tion material.
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Indeed, the general euphoria was interrupted by regular evening quarrels between man-
agement and employees. These quarrels occupied at least two working hours every day, 
were strongly emotionally loaded26 – which would not fit into the picture of economic 
actors as pure strategic opportunists – and showed that self-deception was involved. In 
fact, disappointment did not result in depression and apathy but rather in voluntarism, 
disregard of hindering obstacles and continuous injections of confidence regarding the 
solidity of the plans.27
The beliefs about the company’s success were strongly intertwined with another one of 
the entrepreneurs’ wishes – the wish to be a German company, which in turn translates 
into playing this role in China. Indeed, due to their experience in Germany as sojourn-
ers, the two entrepreneurs had developed ideas about the German business model that 
they were eager to implement in their own company based on their conviction of actu-
ally being German entrepreneurs.
The fact that the Chinese couple was not simply deceiving others but indeed playing 
the role of German entrepreneurs is also evident in the social interactions and work-
ing culture in the office. First of all, despite working in China, the two entrepreneurs 
refused to speak Chinese with the German interns and urged them to talk in German 
even in front of the Chinese employees, which was rather inefficient.28 Secondly, they 
were keen on cultivating typical German customs in the Chinese company, at least in 
appearance. For example, they placed a German coffee machine in a very visible place, 
even though there was no coffee available, and stored (sometimes German) biscuits 
for the employees on the shelves despite the fact that Chinese people usually do not 
eat pastries. Thirdly, they were committed to the adoption of typical institutions of the 
German training model while simultaneously distorting their nature. The same intern-
ships that in Germany have the function of providing students with the opportunity to 
get an inside scoop into business became cornerstones for building and promoting the 
Germanness of the company. For example, the German interns had to create presenta-
tions for the students that illustrated the characteristics and advantages of the German 
model of internship that Company Ma was indeed practicing and simply offering to the 
students and potential future trainees as an opportunity. They were required to teach 
instead of to learn. Moreover, the general idea of the company training its own future 
employees can reasonably be interpreted as an imitation of the German institution of 
vocational training by offering schooling in China by German trainers and work expe-
26 Unfortunately, because the four Chinese were shouting simultaneously, talking fast and making 
use of dialect, it was not possible to decipher the precise contents of the quarrels.
27 Every morning new motivation was built up by restating the company’s glorious perspectives 
and by cheering each other on for working hard to reach the goal. This practice became almost 
ritualized by striking out the days left until the start of the SAP course on a sheet of paper hang-
ing in a visible place in the office.
28 In fact, while the German interns could speak Chinese, the German language skills of the two 
entrepreneurs were relatively poor and, above all, the Chinese employees could not follow the 
conversations in German.
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rience through internships in Germany. This kind of apprenticeship is necessarily very 
restricted with regard to content. Nevertheless, in Company Ma it was intended to be 
used for the recruitment of a comprehensive body of human resources.29 
The entrepreneurs were eager to act as if they were leading a German company; there-
fore they translated German ideas that they knew about. However, their knowledge of 
the German system was not accurate enough; instead, it was built on stereotypes to 
which they held on despite the evidence. For instance, as an intern, the observer was 
asked to prepare a PowerPoint presentation illustrating dress codes and general codes 
of behavior for trainees in the German business environment. It soon turned out that 
the two entrepreneurs had very precise ideas about these German codes and how they 
should be presented, but when the researcher contradicted their convictions and under-
lined the variety of company cultures, they interpreted this as a lack of experience on 
her part and simply cancelled the task. 
To sum up, as evidenced by the great euphoria, the influence of wishes and role an-
ticipation despite contradicting evidence, self-deception appears to have been involved 
in Company Ma’s business practices and to have contributed to successfully deceiving 
others.
This is, in fact, reflected in the way the story ended. According to the websites of both 
Company Ma and Company AG,30 Company Ma suddenly closed down its previous 
business in northern China and moved to Shanghai. Apparently the business was not 
as profitable as it was presented and believed to be by the two Chinese entrepreneurs.31 
However, not least because of a certain naïveté and willingness to believe on the Ger-
man side,32 Company Ma got a second chance. In fact, the pre-existing contact between 
Company Ma and Company AG did indeed prepare the groundwork for the German 
firm to start its business in China. Only six months after the stipulation of the first busi-
29 In Germany, the contents provided in vocational training are more extensive. Moreover, the 
trainees constitute only a small share of the companies’ human resources, and apprenticeship is 
part of a long-term strategy, certainly not the main recruitment strategy.
30 Unfortunately, the internship in the Chinese subsidiary was over before the researcher could 
personally observe the outcomes of Company Ma’s plans, which were highly dependent on the 
success of the SAP training. Therefore, our information on this issue is based on the content of 
the websites mentioned above.
31 If the business in northern China had been profitable, Company Ma would most probably have 
opened a subsidiary in Shanghai instead of relocating the whole business. This seems even more 
plausible considering the fact that the managers, who originated from the previous business 
location, had to abandon not only their business contacts but also their families, which is a very 
hard decision, especially in the Chinese culture (Logan/Bian/Bian 1998).
32 Euphoria and wishful thinking also seem to imbue decision-making processes in Western com-
panies planning to invest in emerging capitalist countries and prevent these companies from ac-
curately controlling their partners abroad. In this sense, globalization also provides the perfect 
audience for a deceptive show, namely businesses in developed countries with strong but shal-
low beliefs in the absolute profitability of the global economy. For more about the rationality 
failure of German entrepreneurs investing in China, see also Piotti (2009a, 2010).
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ness contract between the two companies, Company Ma managed to become the main 
cooperation partner and probably the local de facto manager of the Chinese subsidiary 
of Company AG in Shanghai.33 
7 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to investigate the nature of deception in markets. While infor-
mation economics and the game-theoretical approach to trust would assume deception 
to be mainly strategic, behavioral economics, rationality studies and sociology would 
agree on the fact that beliefs and wishes play an important role in self-deception and in 
the deception of others. While behavioral economics and rationality studies identify the 
drivers of deception in cognitive biases and contradicting beliefs that can lead to irra-
tional decisions, for sociology, deception can be generated in processes of identification 
and in the theatrical playing of roles that individuals strive to fulfill in reality. 
In the case of the (German) Chinese company studied in our research, we have found 
evidence for strategic deception and opportunistic behavior as a constitutive part of 
the company entering the market. Indeed, at first glance, some of the lies contained in 
the company’s presentations to the public appear to be intended to mislead potential 
clients. The deceptive information about the successful cooperation with high-ranking 
multinationals and about the date of the company’s foundation have been strategically 
used to instill the belief that this is a well-established German company. However, at 
second glance, the lines between strategic deception and self-deception turn out not to 
be clear-cut. The example of the baseless promises of internships in Germany made to 
SAP trainees shows that even though the guarantee of an internship was objectively a 
lie, the entrepreneurs were in fact acting anticipatorily, as if their wishes were already 
reality. In line with this argumentation, the deceptive presentation of the company to 
the public becomes part of a theatrical play which the entrepreneurs were acting out 
in line with their desires and aspirations. It is a play that they kept on acting even with 
their own employees, which cannot be explained by a pure strategy of manipulating 
external actors.
As a matter of fact, deception is strictly entangled with self-deception, i.e., with acting 
as if reality conformed to one’s wishes, despite all evidence. Self-deception can even be-
come a comparative advantage, because the actors truly believe their own lies and can 
therefore fool others more easily. 
33 It should be noted that the contact person for the Shanghai office of Company AG has his seat in 
Europe and that no personnel of the company appear to be working in the Chinese subsidiary.
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